inflation, fiscal adjustments, and public debt reduction, combined with high flows of foreign capital that had an impact on dollar devaluation policies.
Based on that, some experts have interpreted South America's interest in increasing military spending over the past five years as the result of high levels of economic growth, a stronger currency due to the devaluation of the dollar -which stimulates import practices -, and political will to modernize the armed forces of the sub-region, which have obsolete arms stockpile 7 . Notwithstanding, is it enough to claim an arms race in South America based on the fact that there is an increase in investment numbers? Indeed, reactions coming from some countries may suggest a movement in that direction, raising concern about this possibility; for instance, Colombia concerns with Venezuela's arms purchases, particularly regarding uncertainty about the "ultimate consumers" of such products. Thus, the Colombian government has come to favor mechanisms for monitoring Venezuelan arms purchases 8 . Bolivia and Peru have also expressed concern with increasing on armaments spending by Chile. As points out a study by Gustavo Gutiérrez, " […] military expenditure, measured in US dollars, in relation to the GDP shows […] a great amount of spending by Chile in a program to modernize the Army, which effectively raises suspicion and alarms its neighbors […] ." 9 This paper, however, does not intend to discuss whether or not there is an "arms race" in South America, but to systematize information that can substantiate such debate by mapping military expenditure in countries of the region that maintain Armed Forces with complex structures and that purchase sophisticated weaponry, drawing tendencies for this entering decade.
An outlook of weapons' purchases in South America
Since 2005, Chile and Venezuela (and, to a lesser extent, Brazil) had the greatest increase in weapons imports among South American countries, giving rise to the delicate question of whether their excessive concern with modernizing the armed forces could not have the negative effect of fueling an arms race in the region and destabilizing governments by transferring part of the acquired arsenal to national or regional non-state groups. The Venezuelan case has drawn the most attention.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published in the summer of 2008 its annual balance report of export, import and transfer of weapons around the world accounting for numbers of the previous year. Interestingly, for the first time, SIPRI's report devoted a whole chapter to analyze the purchase and transfer of arms in South America. At SIPRI Yearbook 2008, emphasis is given to three countries: Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. In a mediumterm analysis, SIPRI showed a percentage increase in arms transfers in South America: "States of South America accounted for 5% of the volume of international transfers of conventional weapons imported for the period 2003-2007 -and 47% higher than in 1998-2002." 10 These acquisitions could be transforming South America in an "emerging arms market." For example, in the cases of Chile and Venezuela, the volume of conventional weapons imported from Russia and Britain could turn them into a market equivalent to other regions of the world such as North Africa. Not surprisingly, countries that export conventional weaponsRussia in particular -have pointed out that the economic success and obsolescence of weapons systems in Latin America offer good opportunities for the sale of new military equipment 11 . Several important questions are essential to be considered when dealing with military spending budgets. In accordance to the methodology designed by Red Atlas de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), these questions are: 1) which countries spend on weapons; 2) what resources are being spent on; 3) why countries decide to spend on arms (motivation); and 4) how military expenditure is funded 12 . Answers to these questions may give a more or less dramatic tone to the issue of arms purchases in the region. In the next sections, South American countries with large military structures -Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela -become the focus of attention in order to answer the first, third, and fourth questions above mentioned 13 . There is disagreement among sources when it comes to recognize Venezuela as the main arms investor in South America if it is considered the relation between military expenditure/GDP. During the period 2000-2009 the country only invested 1.4% of its GDP in military expenditure. The fact is that "Venezuela has increased dramatically its weapon imports [and] 15 . Such an amount, however, was lower than the amount of weapons imported by Chile in 2003-2007: Venezuela spent US$ 1,417 billion against US$ 2,283 billion spent by Chile. Several years of constant increase in oil prices, political will from President Chávez to improve the country's military capabilities, and presidential will to boost Venezuela's political position in the region have led the country to larger increments in its military capacities.
A remarkable fact is that in recent years there has been a considerable distance between the original military budget set and the actual yearly spending in Venezuela. This may explain why in 2006 and 2007 Venezuela ranked fourth and eighth respectively among developing countries, receiving more delivery of weapons and having signed more arms transfer agreements. 16 The discrepancy between actual and expected budget spending is a consequence of legal mechanisms that allow additional allocation of resources to the military during a fiscal year. The most relevant of such mechanisms is called Paraguas Act (Ley Paraguas, in Spanish). This legal instrument, that dates back many years, allows the government to negotiate foreign loans to finance extra military spendings not always included in the initial budget, although the government has announced its intention to limit the application of the Act or even to eliminate it altogether. 17 However, what kind of weapons is Venezuela buying and which countries or groups is it buying from? Between 2005 and 2007, there was a big jump in Venezuelan weapons purchases, estimated at US$ 4 billion, most of it coming from Russia. Since 2005, Venezuela has purchased from Russia 100,000 Kalashnikov automatic rifles AK-47, 24 Sukhoi Su-30MK fighter aircrafts, 10 MI-35 combat helicopters, approximately 40 Mi-17-V multitasking transport, and 3 Mi-26 heavy transport helicopters 18 . In 2007, two new agreements on arms purchases were signed with Russia. According to these documents, Venezuela would receive a package of 5 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines and possibly ground missiles and long-range S-Type Club. Venezuela also bought in the same period from China 3 three-dimensional JYl radars 19 . It should be noted that the trend that puts Russia as the main supplier of weapons to Venezuela was consolidated over the comprised years being considered here. From 2003 to 2007, Russia provided 93% of the weapons bought by Venezuela while China and Israel represent 3% and 2% of the total of arms imports, respectively 20 . In practice some of the weapons systems purchased from Russia supplement purchases made from China. For example, Venezuela probably acquired from Russia a ground-air Tor-M1 missile system. According to the country's Ministry of Defense, three Chinese radars -also purchased -will support the functions of the Russian system and even the Sukhoi aircraft fighters. In sum, Venezuela in 2007 was the third largest market to Russia's arms exports in the world (accounting for 5%, although this percentage is well below the 45% Russia exported to China and the 22% Russia exported to India) 21 . The US embargo on arms transferring to Venezuela probably had the undesirable impact for the United States of Venezuela turning to Russia as its weapons supplier. In 2006, the US State Department imposed an embargo that prevents Venezuela from importing goods and services of Defense nature. In the same year, Venezuela was certified by the US government, under Section 40A of the Arms and Control Act (AECA), as a country "not fully cooperative" in the fight against terrorism. The AECA certification was renewed in 2007 and 2008. By this mechanism, Venezuela is not allowed any assistance, sale or financing by the US military. In practice, the US embargo on arms sales has led representatives of the Venezuelan armed forces to pressure the executive to look for alternative import markets. Several arms-producing countries are alert to Venezuela's air force plans to buy other types of aircraft attached to the Sukhois purchased from Russia.
Actually, the result of the US arms embargo has not been much different than expected. Combined with Venezuelan armed forces interest in buying weapons, the embargo was a strong incentive for the establishment of closer relations between Russia and Venezuela beyond 22 27 .The Russian Defense Ministry announced, though, that after undertaking the scheduled training, the aircraft would return to its home base 28 . At the same time, pressures from the US government on arms-producing countries such as Spain, Brazil, and France have also had the unintended effect of inducing Russia to enter on the Venezuelan market. Pressure from the US prevented the finalization of an agreement signed by Venezuela and Spain in the second half of 2005 for the purchase of two patrol boats type 10C and a 296 CN-235 transport aircraft. The US claimed that marketing authorization was ). Chile has also been the only Latin American country to maintain throughout the first decade of the 2000s its military spending above 3.5% of its GDP, except for the year 2007, in which it was exceeded by Venezuela.
From 2003 to 2007, Chile's main import market for conventional arms was the European Union, accounting for 82% of the country's weapons imports, followed by the United States, accounting for 15%, and Israel, with 3%
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. As some analysts suggest, choosing Western countries as its main supplier can be explained by Chile's intentions to acquire NATO standard military status and certainly the strategic partnership that the country intends to strengthen with the US in the coming decades in the political, economic, and military domains.
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In a short-term analysis, in 2007 Chile appears as the main South American importer of arms from Britain, occupying, alongside Romania, the second place in Britain's list of global arms exports (9% of its total exports of weapons for both countries). The dynamism of Chilean arms imports was reflected in the growth of 23% of its military budget in 2007. 33 Chilean constant level of military expenditure has been made possible by two circumstances. First, the country's good economic performance in the first decade of the century. Pinochet military regime, the government regulated that 10% of copper exports were to be directed to the funding of military equipment purchases and operational expenses 35 . It should be noted that Chile is the world's first copper exporter and its commodity prices in the international market have experienced a steep growth over the first decade of the 2000s. 36 According to some calculations, the Copper Law contributed, for many years, with an annual average of US$ 200 million to the military budget. Due to the increase in international prices, it is estimated that the Law alone contributes with US$ 1 billion to the military budget, leading to strong pressure from political and social sectors in Chile to revise or abolish the act. The increase of 23% in the military budget in 2007 was a preventive action in response to the existence of these social and political pressures emphasizing the need to abolish or reform the Law. These sectors advocate for military spending to be financed by the regular or general fiscal year budget 37 . In short, "[t]he key to the increase in Chilean military spending is the steep rise of international copper prices in recent years. The Copper Law implemented in 1958 and later amended during the 17-year dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet stipulates that the Armed Forces are automatically granted 10% of all sales (not profits) made by the stateowned Codelco, the world's biggest copper producing company." spending in the region. The numbers for expenditure on arms purchase for the period (US$ 210 million) are far lower than Chile, Venezuela or even Brazil's acquisitions in the same period. In fact, Colombia spent 3.6% of its GDP on military expenditure in 2000-2009, the highest percentage in Latin America. Except for Chile, which spent 3.5% of its GDP during these years, the rest of South American countries spent less than 2%. The main suppliers of arms to Colombia during the period 2003-2008 were the United States (39%), Spain (26.2%), Brazil (17%), Italy (5.2%), and Canada (4.5%). It is remarkable that Colombia is the only South American country that has in another Latin American country -Brazil -one of its main import markets of weapons.
To unravel the existing discrepancy between armaments purchases and a relatively high percentage of GDP spent on defense it is necessary to look at the structure of military spending funding sources. In addition to the defense budget, the Colombian government receives a war tax from cities and provinces (generating a revenue of approximately US$ 400 million a year) complemented by a new tax, . Brazil occupied, in 2010, the 30 th position in the world ranking of weapons importers. "However, the elect Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has delayed awarding a US$ 2 billion contract for advanced combat aircraft and a US$ 6 billion contract for frigates and offshore patrol vessels (OPVs)." 49 However, attention must be paid to the fact that Brazilian military spending of nearly US$ 70 billion in the period 2003-2007 is diluted by the size of its economy: for 2007, the country's GDP was around US$ 1.5 trillion (or R$ 2.5 trillion 50 ). Taking into account the relation military spending/GDP, Brazil spends little on defense (1.6% of its GDP) when compared to Colombia (3.5%) or Chile of technology transfer. In 2010, in a first step towards implementing the National Defense Strategy, the National Congress approved a project to restructure the armed forces that foresees the creation of a Joint General Staff to work under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. In this same direction, a draft proposal to Brazil's first Defense White Paper was issued in 2011. According to this document, every four years the government will have to submit to the National Congress detailed information on its defense policies and strategies along with plans to a continued modernization of the armed forces 52 . The Brazilian Navy plans to purchase at least 33 modern ships by 2025 in order to make patrolling of maritime boundaries more effective. However, some projects, such as the development of the Brazilian nuclear submarine, have been delayed to meet more pressing demands such as the modernization of existing ships. Thus, in 2006 a further postponement of the project (which had its first impulse almost 30 years ago) was announced and the Navy stated its intentions to give priority to the modernization of the existing Type-209 submarine and the construction of a submarine (Type 214) using German technology. In any case, the nuclear submarine project received a strong stimulus when the Brazilian government announced in mid-2007 its plan to invest US$ 1 billion over an eightyear period in buying German and/or French technology for the construction of a reactor, which is linked up to the submarine project.
The Brazilian Air Force has experienced lack of resources just as the Navy. 57 . Some analysis suggests that it is not by chance that Brazil, like Chile, has given preference to Western suppliers, with special interest in NATO members, rather than Russia or China. That would be a deliberate selection, following a rationality involving "strategic choice": its emergence as a regional power in the next decade does not seem to predict a relationship of rivalry with the West, but on the contrary, a partnership for regional security plans 58 . It should be noted, however, that due to domestic political conditions and financial difficulties, Brazil has bought second-hand weapons. Thus the country bought 12 used Mirage 2000C from France, which were delivered into three batches of 4 aircrafts in 2006, 2007 and 2008 . From Spain, the country bought 12 new C-295M transport aircrafts, which were delivered by the end of 2008, and 2 Lockheed P-3 Orion aircrafts set up for maritime surveillance. Brazil also acquired 9 F-5E aircrafts from Saudi Arabia and has a project to purchase 240 Leopard 1A5 tanks to the Army (having already received the first two lots) 59 . From the Brazilian private company Embraer, the government has purchased 50 Super Tucano EBM-314 training and combat aircrafts and, to cater to the Army, signed a contract to purchase 2,044 units of armored wheeled transport VBTP, now dubbed Guarani, in different versions.
There are two other South American countries that have important regional armed forces in the region and have shown willingness to modernize its military structures in the coming years: Peru and Argentina. The case of Peru, whose former president Alan Garcia announced in 2007 plans to invest over US$ 1 billion in modernizing the armed forces 60 , is of particular importance since, following Brazil, Peru is the country that has numerically the largest armed forces in South America 70 Under the government of Cristina Kirchner, Argentina undertook the modernization of UH-1 helicopters and light attack IA-58 Pucara aircrafts, extending their operational life for at least another ten years. Two units of Russian helicopter Mil Mi-17V were acquired to undertake operations in Antarctica. 71 In mid-2007, though, the government announced a more comprehensive modernization program of its armed forces 72 , including purchases from France (traditional supplier of Argentina in the past), Ukraine, and Russia. From France, Argentina intends to acquire second-hand Mirage 2000 C/Ds and Mica and Exocet missiles; from Ukraine, an An-70/72 transport aircraft to replace the old C-130. These purchases were, however, by the end of the first decade, still a plan, and it seems that Cristina Kirchner's government will further postpone the modernization project of Argentinean military.
In Almost all South American countries announced large military plans to modernize and reform its armed forces, necessarily implying an increase in spending on the medium-term. That suggests military spending should increase over the next ten years 75 .
Almost all South American countries have initiated a recapitalization of its obsolete military stockpile, dated in its majority to the 1950s to 1960s, being the most modern ones from the 1980s. This recapitalization aims solely to update and replace old military equipment. Apart from the cases of Chile and Venezuela, other South American countries intend to upgrade their equipment, and the purchase of second-hand transportation units and weaponry seems to be the preferred choice due to financial constraints. Spending in 2010 was 42% higher in South America than in 2002, and military spending increased significantly in 7 of the 10 South American countries, including countries relatively less influent in regional affairs like Paraguay (16%) and Peru (16%), with low military expenditure through the first decade of the millennium 76 . South American countries with major military capability (specifically Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) benefit from additional mechanisms to increase their military budget beyond the legislative stipulation for defense expenditures (the Copper Law in Chile, the "Umbrella Law" in Colombia, etc.). Therefore, the original military budget in each fiscal year rarely coincides with the real military spending.
There is great asymmetry in the level of arms purchases among South American countries: Chile and Venezuela do not represent the spending pattern of the region. Beyond that, almost all military institutions suffer from financial constraints, hence the option for purchasing second-hand equipment to be credited as the most viable way of funding their modernization projects.
There is a strong tendency among the Andean countries (plus Chile) to use their export commodities (oil, gas, and copper) to finance military spending and support its plans to modernize the Armed Forces and their military equipment.
South American weaponry market is no longer predominated by the United States. EU countries such as Great Britain, Spain, Germany, and France configure the main import markets for weapons. Russia has an aggressive policy of weapons exportation towards the region but still focus most of its initiatives to countries such as Venezuela.
